Capital process and optimality properties of a Bayesian Skeptic in
  coin-tossing games by Kumon, Masayuki et al.
ar
X
iv
:m
at
h/
05
10
66
2v
2 
 [m
ath
.ST
]  
26
 Se
p 2
00
8
Capital process and optimality properties of
a Bayesian Skeptic in coin-tossing games
Masayuki Kumon
Risk Analysis Research Center
Institute of Statistical Mathematics
Akimichi Takemura
Graduate School of Information Science and Technology
University of Tokyo
and
Kei Takeuchi
Faculty of International Studies
Meiji Gakuin University
Abstract
We study capital process behavior in the fair-coin and biased-coin games in the
framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). We show
that if Skeptic uses a Bayesian strategy with a beta prior, the capital process is
lucidly expressed in terms of the past average of Reality’s moves. From this it is
proved that the Skeptic’s Bayesian strategy weakly forces the strong law of large
numbers (SLLN) with the convergence rate of O(
√
log n/n) and if Reality violates
SLLN then the exponential growth rate of the capital process is very accurately
described in terms of the Kullback divergence between the average of Reality’s
moves when she violates SLLN and the average when she observes SLLN. We also
investigate optimality properties associated with Bayesian strategy.
Keywords and phrases: Azuma-Hoeffding-Bennett inequality, beta-binomial distribution,
exchangeability, game-theoretic probability, hypergeometric distribution, Kullback diver-
gence, prior distribution.
1 Introduction
Coin tossing is the most basic object in the study of probability theory. This is also true
in the new field of game-theoretic probability and finance established by Shafer and Vovk
(2001). In fact they start with discussing the fair-coin game in Section 3.1 of their book.
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Recently Kumon and Takemura (2007)[6], motivated by Takeuchi’s works ([14], [15]),
proved that a very simple single strategy, based only on the past average of Reality’s
moves, is weakly forcing SLLN with the convergence rate of O(
√
log n/n), which is a
substantial improvement over the original strategy of Shafer and Vovk. Versions of SLLN
for unbounded moves by Reality is obtained in Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi (2007)[7].
In this paper for general biased-coin games, we consider a class of Bayesian strategies
for Skeptic. As in Kumon and Takemura (2007) we prove that Bayesian strategies in
the class weakly force SLLN with the convergence rate of O(
√
logn/n). Furthermore we
establish the important fact that if Skeptic uses a Bayesian strategy and Reality violates
SLLN, then the exponential growth rate of the Skeptic’s capital process is very accurately
described in terms of the Kullback divergence between the average of Reality’s moves
when she violates SLLN and the average when she observes SLLN.
In the protocol of the coin-tossing game of Shafer and Vovk (2001), there is no prob-
abilistic assumption on the behavior of Reality. In the games, Skeptic tries to become
rich and Reality tries to prevent it. However in the Bayesian strategy, Skeptic simply and
naively assumes that Reality behaves probabilistically and for choosing his moves Skeptic
uses the Bayesian prediction of Reality’s moves. It is a remarkable fact that this naive
Bayesian prediction by Skeptic actually works and forces SLLN even if Reality’s moves
are not probabilistic at all and Reality tries to beat Skeptic as an adversary. Furthermore
Skeptic achieves an optimal growth rate if Reality violates SLLN in a way accounted for
by the prior. As in the standard statistical decision theory (e.g. Berger [2] and Robert
[8]), this optimality is inherent in Bayesian procedures. However in the setting of the
present paper, only a very simple protocol of the game is assumed and no other modeling
assumptions are made on Reality’s moves. In this sense, we believe that the optimality
considered in this paper has much broader conceptual implications than those offered by
the standard statistical decision theory.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we formulate coin-tossing
games and set up some notations. In Section 3 we formulate Bayesian strategy of Skeptic
for a given probability distribution on the space of Reality’s moves. In particular we
consider Bayes procedures with respect to beta-binomial distribution and hypergeometric
distribution. In Section 4 we show that Skeptic’s capital process is expressed in a closed
form when he uses a Bayesian strategy of Section 3. Then using Stirling’s formula we prove
that the exponential growth rate of the capital process is naturally described by means
of the Kullback divergence. In Section 5 we consider the case that Skeptic is restricted
to only buy the tickets in coin-tossing games. In Section 6 some numerical examples are
presented. We end the paper with some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Notations on coin-tossing game
Here we prepare some notations on coin-tossing games. We consider a general biased-coin
game between Skeptic and Reality in the following parametrization. In the protocol, the
head and the tail of coin are coded as 1 and 0, respectively. Furthermore the probability
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of heads 0 < ρ < 1 is given.
Biased-Coin Game
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {−ρ, 1− ρ}.
Kn = Kn−1 +Mnxn.
END FOR
Skeptic starts with the initial capital K0 = 1. For each round n, Skeptic first announces
Mn, which is the number of tickets he buys. xn stands for a ticket which sells for the price
of ρ and it pays the amount of one if Reality chooses heads and nothing if she chooses
tails. ρ is called the risk neutral probability (e.g. Takemura and Suzuki (2007)). Except
for Section 5 we consider the case that Skeptic is allowed to sell the tickets (Mn < 0).
Mnxn is the increment of Skeptic’s capital from round n − 1 to n. The case ρ = 1/2 is
the fair-coin game. Although most of our results can be presented in the fair-coin game,
it is instructive to consider the biased-coin game for the additional asymmetry.
Let ξn = x1 . . . xn denote the sequence of Reality’s moves up to time n. hn denotes the
number of heads and tn = n− hn denotes the number of tails in ξn. Furthermore write
sn = nx¯n = x1 + · · ·+ xn, s0 = 0.
Then sn = hn − ρn and
hn = sn + ρn,
hn
n
= ρ+ x¯n, tn = n− (sn + ρn), tn
n
= 1− ρ− x¯n. (1)
In the above biased-coin game, as discussed below, Reality is forced to observe SLLN
x¯n → 0 or equivalently to follow the risk neutral probability hn/n→ ρ.
In the following we write
νn =
Mn
Kn−1
and express the recursive relation of the capital process in the multiplicative form Kn =
Kn−1(1 + νnxn). Then starting from the initial capital K0 = 1, the capital process is
written as
Kn =
n∏
i=1
(1 + νixi).
As in Shafer and Vovk (2001), we can think that Skeptic chooses his strategy P which
specifies νi = νi(x1, . . . , xi−1) as a function of x1, . . . , xi−1. Note that Skeptic has to choose
− 1
1− ρ < νi <
1
ρ
(2)
if he has to avoid bankruptcy (Ki ≤ 0).
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In the protocol above there is no probabilistic assumption on the behavior of Reality.
Suppose however that Skeptic models Reality’s moves x1, . . . , xn by a probability distri-
bution Q = Qn on {−ρ, 1 − ρ}n. We denote the conditional expectation of xi under Q
given x1, . . . , xi−1 by
xˆQi = EQ(xi | x1, . . . , xi−1) = pˆQi − ρ, i = 1, . . . , n,
where
pˆQi = pˆ
Q
i (x1, . . . , xi−1) = Q(xi = 1− ρ | x1, . . . , xi−1)
is the conditional probability of heads.
3 Bayesian strategy and its optimality
In this section, we first discuss optimality inherent in a Bayesian strategy. It is not obvious
how to formulate optimality of Skeptic’s strategies. Allowing equalities in (2), for each
fixed path of Reality’s moves ξn = x1 . . . xn up to time n, the optimum moves of Skeptic
are given as
νi =
{
1/ρ if xi = 1− ρ
−1/(1− ρ) if xi = −ρ
(3)
for i = 1, . . . , n, with the resulting capital Kn = ρ−hn(1 − ρ)−tn . However this argument
is clearly meaningless because in each round Skeptic has to choose νi first and Reality
chooses xi after seeing νi. For Skeptic’s strategy P and a path ξn, we denote his log
capital by logKPn (ξn) and denote a weight of the path by w(ξn) ≥ 0. Then we consider
the weighted average of logKPn (ξn) and evaluate Skeptic’s strategy P by∑
ξn∈{−ρ,1−ρ}n
w(ξn) logKPn (ξn). (4)
There is no loss of generality in assuming 1 =
∑
ξn∈{−ρ,1−ρ}n w(ξ
n). Therefore {w(ξn)} is
a probability measure Q and (4) can be written as
EQ[logKPn (ξn)]. (5)
For a given Q the optimum P = PQ maximizing (5) is given as follows by a standard
backward induction argument of dynamic programming. We call PQ the Bayesian strategy
for Q.
Theorem 3.1. The optimum strategy P = PQ maximizing (5) is given by
νi(x1, . . . , xi−1) =
pˆQi − ρ
ρ(1− ρ) =
xˆQi
ρ(1− ρ) =
EQ(xi | x1, . . . , xi−1)
ρ(1− ρ) , i = 1, . . . , n. (6)
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Proof. Consider the optimum move of Skeptic at the last round n, given all previous
moves of the players. The terms of
logKPn (ξn) =
n∑
i=1
log(1 + νi(x1, . . . , xi−1)xi)
are all fixed except for the last term log(1 + νnxn). Consider maximizing the conditional
expected value g(ν) = EQ(log(1 + νxn) | x1, . . . , xn−1). g(ν) is a concave function of ν
and under the convention 0 = 0 log 0, g(ν) is maximized by solving g′(ν) = 0 as long as
this equation has a solution in [−1/(1− ρ), 1/ρ]. Now
g′(ν) = pˆQn
1− ρ
1 + ν(1− ρ) − (1− pˆ
Q
n )
ρ
1− νρ.
Solving this we have
νn(x1, . . . , xn−1) =
pˆQn − ρ
ρ(1− ρ) =
xˆQn
ρ(1− ρ) .
Note that (pˆQn − ρ)/ρ(1 − ρ) ∈ [−1/(1 − ρ), 1/ρ]. Therefore the optimum move of the
Skeptic at the last round i = n is given by (6). Now for the round i = n−1 we can do the
same argument based on the conditional distribution of xn−1 given x1, . . . , xn−2. Then by
backward induction (6) is proved for all i = n− 1, . . . , 1.
In the beginning of this section we argued that (3) for a fixed sequence ξn = x1 . . . xn
is meaningless. However Theorem 3.1 reduces to (3) if Q is a point mass at a particular
ξn. This shows that the optimality in Theorem 3.1 for a given Q is in a sense a trivial
inherent optimality of a Bayes procedure and the important question is the choice of the
probability measure Q. In the following we consider various choices of Q, including those
whose support is a proper subset of {−ρ, 1− ρ}n.
The obvious first candidate for Q is the Bernoulli model, where Reality is modeled to
choose her move independently for each round as Q(xi = 1 − ρ) = p = 1 − Q(xi = −ρ).
Then
Q(ξn) = phn(1− p)tn ,
where hn and tn are the numbers of heads and tails in ξ
n = x1 . . . xn. In this case pˆ
Q
i = p
for all i and νi = (p−ρ)/ρ(1−ρ) is a constant. We see that the fixed ǫ-strategy of Chapter
3 in Shafer and Vovk (2001) corresponds to this case.
From Bayesian viewpoint it is natural to consider a mixture of the Bernoulli model
with respect to a beta prior, which is the natural conjugate to the binomial distribution.
Suppose that Skeptic has a prior beta distribution π on the success probability p of the
Bernoulli model.
π(dp) =
1
B(α, β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1dp, α, β > 0. (7)
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We can think of α and β as prior numbers of heads and tails. Then
Q(ξn) =
1
B(α, β)
∫
1
0
phn+α−1(1− p)tn+β−1dp = B(α + hn, β + tn)
B(α, β)
=
(Γ(α+ hn)/Γ(α))× (Γ(β + tn)/Γ(β))
Γ(α + β + n)/Γ(α+ β)
(8)
is the beta-binomial distribution and we call this model “beta-binomial model” and call
the Skeptic’s associated strategy “beta-binomial strategy”. In this model
pˆQn =
B(α + hn−1 + 1, β + tn−1)
B(α + hn−1, β + tn−1)
=
α + hn−1
α + β + n− 1 , (9)
and it follows that
νi =
pˆQi − ρ
ρ(1− ρ) =
(1− ρ)α− ρβ + si−1
(α + β + i− 1)ρ(1− ρ) , i = 1, . . . , n. (10)
Finally we consider a hypergeometric model, whose support may be a proper subset
of {−ρ, 1 − ρ}n. This is a somewhat artificial model, but it is useful as a benchmark in
considering optimality of the beta-binomial strategy. As we see below the hypergeometric
model has an opposite characteristic to the beta-binomial model. Let N ≥ n and 0 ≤
M ≤ N be positive integers.
Consider an urn containing M red balls and N − M black balls. Skeptic models
Reality’s behavior in such a way that Reality draws a ball from the urn one by one without
replacement and she chooses heads if the ball is red in the i-th drawing. Therefore Skeptic
is considering an initial part of a finite horizon game with N rounds. Under this model
Q(ξn) =
1(
n
hn
)
(
M
hn
)(
N−M
tn
)
(
N
n
) = (M !/(M − hn)!)× ((N −M)!/(N −M − tn)!)
N !/(N − n)! , (11)
0 ≤ hn ≤M, 0 ≤ tn ≤ N −M,
and
pˆQn =
Q(x1 . . . xn−1(1− ρ))
Q(x1 . . . xn−1)
=
(M − hn−1)!
(M − hn−1 − 1)!
(N − n)!
(N − n+ 1)! =
M − hn−1
N − n + 1 . (12)
Since the hypergeometric model holds for each i ≤ n, it follows that
νi =
M − si−1 − ρ(i− 1)− ρ(N − i+ 1)
(N − i+ 1)ρ(1− ρ) =
M − ρN − si−1
(N − i+ 1)ρ(1− ρ) . (13)
Note the similarities between (8) and (11) and between (9) and (12). If we put
α = −M, β = −(N −M), (14)
then (9) coincides with (12).
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In order to make the correspondence clearer, define
(a)m = a(a + 1) · · · (a+m− 1), (a)0 = 1,
for real a and non-negative integer m. For a > 0, (a)m = Γ(a +m)/Γ(a). Then with the
correspondence (14), both (8) and (11) can be written as
Q(ξn) =
(α)hn(β)tn
(α + β)n
. (15)
We see that the hypergeometric model is the “negative” of the beta-binomial model. In
the beta-binomial model pˆQn is an increasing function of hn−1, whereas in the hypergeo-
metric model pˆQn is a decreasing function. Another way of understanding the connection
is the Polya’s urn model (e.g. Section V.2 of Feller (1968), Takemura and Suzuki (2005)).
Hypergeometric model corresponds to sampling without replacement, Bernoulli model cor-
responds to sampling with replacement and beta-binomial model corresponds to Polya’s
urn model where a ball with the same color is added at each draw.
The extreme case of the hypergeometric model is the case N = n. Then Q is con-
centrated on ξn with the number of heads exactly equal to M . Among the exchangeable
models, in the sense that they assign the same probability to all ξn with the same number
of heads, this model is most “meaningless” as in the very first example of this section.
Note that the support of the hypergeometric model is the whole sample space {−ρ, 1−ρ}n
if and only if n ≤ min(M,N −M). One way of justifying the hypergeometric model is
to add a requirement in the protocol of the game, such that Reality has to choose her
path in the support of Q. By this requirement Reality’s move space is decreased and
the game becomes more favorable to Skeptic. This implies that the hypergeometric case,
in particular the extreme case N = n, can serve as an upper bound to Skeptic’s capital
process. We should also mention de Finetti’s theorem ([4], [13]), which states that an
infinite sequence of exchangeable 0-1 random variables has to be a mixture of infinite in-
dependent Bernoulli trials. We see that the hypergeometric model is naturally associated
with a finite horizon game.
4 Capital precess of Bayesian strategy
In this section we investigate capital process when Skeptic uses a Bayesian strategy. We
first give a general formula for Skeptic’s capital as a ratio of the probabilities of Reality’s
path under the assumed distribution and under the risk neutral probability distribution.
This gives us a closed form expression of the capital process for the beta-binomial model
and the hypergeometric model of the previous section. Then for the beta-binomial model,
we use Stirling’s formula to describe the exponential growth rate of the capital process.
It leads to the Kullback divergence and proves that the beta-binomial strategy weakly
forces SLLN with the convergence rate of O(
√
logn/n). Finally we consider optimality
of the beta-binomial strategy in relation to the hypergeometric model.
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The following theorem shows that the capital process for a Bayesian strategy can be
written as the ratio of probabilities under the assumed model and under the risk neutral
probability measure.
Theorem 4.1. Let Q = Qn be a probability measure on the set of paths {ξn} of length n
and let PQ denote the Bayesian strategy for Q. The value of the capital process KPQn for
PQ is given by
KPQn (ξn) =
Q(ξn)
ρhn(1− ρ)tn , (16)
where 0 < ρ < 1 is the risk neutral probability.
Proof. We prove (16) by induction on n. Recall that νi = (pˆ
Q
i − ρ)/ρ(1 − ρ). Consider
n = 1. If x1 = 1− ρ, then
KPQ1 = 1 + ν1(1− ρ) = 1 +
pˆQ1 − ρ
ρ
=
pˆQ1
ρ
=
Q(x1 = 1− ρ)
ρ
.
On the other hand if x1 = −ρ, then
KPQ1 = 1− ν1ρ =
1− pˆQ1
1− ρ =
Q(x1 = −ρ)
1− ρ .
This proves (16) for n = 1.
Now suppose that (16) holds up to n− 1. Then
KPQn (ξn) =
Q(ξn−1)
ρhn−1(1− ρ)tn−1 (1 + νnxn).
As in the case of n = 1 it holds that
1 + νnxn =
{
Q(xn = 1− ρ | ξn−1)/ρ if xn = 1− ρ
Q(xn = −ρ | ξn−1)/(1− ρ) if xn = −ρ.
Therefore (16) holds also for n.
Corollary 4.1. For the beta-binomial model and the hypergeometric model
KPQn (ξn) =
1
ρhn(1− ρ)tn
(α)hn(β)tn
(α+ β)n
. (17)
Remark 4.1. Formulation of Theorem 4.1 in the present form was suggested by Vladimir
Vovk to one of the authors in a discussion during the 16th international conference on
algorithmic learning theory. Theorem 4.1 actually follows from some general facts, in-
cluding the equivalence of game-theoretic martingales and measure-theoretic martingales
(Section 8.2 of Shafer and Vovk (2001)), expressing positive martingales with expected
value of 1 as likelihood ratios and the non-negativeness of the Kullback divergence.
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We now use Stirling’s formula to prove that the beta-binomial strategy weakly forces
SLLN. Let α > 0, β > 0 in (17). The log capital process is written as
logKPn (ξn) = −hn log ρ− tn log(1− ρ) + log Γ(α+ hn)− log Γ(α)
+ log Γ(β + tn)− log Γ(β)
− log Γ(α + β + n) + log Γ(α + β).
If both hn and tn are large, we can use Stirling’s formula
log Γ(x) =
(
x− 1
2
)
log x− x+ log
√
2π +O(x−1).
More precisely for all x > 0
0 < log Γ(x)−
[(
x− 1
2
)
log x− x+ log
√
2π
]
<
1
12x
.
For notational simplicity write n′ = α + β + n, h′n = α + hn, t
′
n = β + tn. Then
log Γ(h′n) + log Γ(t
′
n)− log Γ(n′)
= h′n log h
′
n + t
′
n log t
′
n − n′ log n′ −
1
2
log
h′nt
′
n
n′
+ log
√
2π +O
(
1
min(h′n, t
′
n)
)
= h′n log
h′n
n′
+ t′n log
t′n
n′
− 1
2
log
h′nt
′
n
n′
+ log
√
2π +O
(
1
min(h′n, t
′
n)
)
.
For 0 < p, q < 1, let
D(p‖q) = p log p
q
+ (1− p) log 1− p
1− q
denote the Kullback divergence between p and q. Then logKPn is written as
logKPn = n′D
(h′n
n′
∥∥∥ρ)− 1
2
log
h′nt
′
n
n′
+ c0(α, β) +O
(
1
min(h′n, t
′
n)
)
, (18)
where
c0(α, β) = − logB(α, β) + α log ρ+ β log(1− ρ) + log
√
2π.
By the Taylor expansion
D(ρ+ δ‖ρ) = (ρ+ δ) log
(
1 +
δ
ρ
)
+ (1− ρ− δ) log
(
1− δ
1− ρ
)
=
δ2
2ρ∗(1− ρ∗) ,
where ρ∗ is some value between ρ and ρ+δ. Recall that hn/n = ρ+ x¯n. Then with δ = x¯n
we have
logKPn =
nx¯2n
2ρ∗(1− ρ∗) −
1
2
logn +O(1)
=
1
2
(
nx¯2n
ρ(1− ρ) − logn
)
+ o(nx¯2n) +O(1). (19)
Hence we obtain the following result.
9
Theorem 4.2. When Skeptic follows the beta-binomial strategy (α > 0, β > 0) given by
(10),
lim sup
n
(lim inf
n
) KPn =∞
if and only if
lim sup
n
(lim inf
n
)
(
nx¯2n
ρ(1− ρ) − log n
)
=∞.
A sufficient condition for lim supnKPn =∞ is
lim sup
n
√
n|x¯n|√
log n
>
√
ρ(1 − ρ),
and a necessary condition for lim supnKPn =∞ is
lim sup
n
√
n|x¯n|√
log n
≥
√
ρ(1− ρ).
Note that limKPn = ∞ if and only if lim inf KPn = ∞. This theorem states that the
Bayesian strategy (10) weakly forces that x¯n converges to 0. The convergence rate is
O(
√
logn/n) and the the convergence factor is
√
ρ(1− ρ).
We also note that from the log expression (19), the capital KPn behaves as
KPn ≃ nA, A =
1
2ρ(1− ρ)
(
nx¯2n
log n
− ρ(1− ρ)
)
.
Hence we know that, if SLLN holds (x¯n → 0) with a convergence rate slower than
O(
√
logn/n), then Skeptic’s capital grows faster than any polynomial order of n.
Remark 4.2. As clarified by the above argument, the Bayesian strategy which is plain
in itself, greatly simplifies the proof and derivation of the strong law of large numbers for
coin-tossing games. Furthermore Skeptic has a wide choice of prior distributions on the
behavior of Reality, although the question of optimal choice of prior distributions seems
to be a difficult problem. Capital processes for various values of α, β are illustrated by
numerical examples in Section 6.
Remark 4.3. As discussed in Remark 2 of Kumon and Takemura [6], the convergence rate
of O(
√
log n/n) in Theorem 4.2 is closely related to Azuma-Hoeffding-Bennett inequality,
which is a large deviation type inequality for bounded martingale differences. See Azuma
(1967), Dembo and Zeitouni (1998), and Appendix A.7 of Vovk, Gammerman and Shafer
(2005).
Remark 4.4. We also point the importance of game-theoretic results that the question of
the optimal growth rate of Skeptic’s capital cannot even be asked in the standard measure-
theoretic probability theory. This question can be asked in the algorithmic theory of ran-
domness, see e.g. Schnorr (1970) (1971), Vovk (1987). But game-theoretic probability
theory does not suffer from the two serious disadvantages of the algorithmic theory of ran-
domness: the arbitrary constants and the heavy restrictions on the allowed sample spaces
caused by considerations of computability.
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For the rest of this section we consider performance of the beta-binomial strategy
compared to the hypergeometric model. As remarked at the end of Section 3, the extreme
case N = n of the hypergeometric model can serve as an upper bound for the beta-
binomial models. We first state this in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. For every exchangeable probability Q on the set of paths {ξn} of length
n, the following inequality holds for each ξn.
1
ρhn(1− ρ)tn
hn!tn!
n!
≥ KPQn (ξn). (20)
Proof. The left-hand side is the value of the capital process for the hypergeometric prior
with n = N . The prior is the uniform distribution over the set of paths {ξn} with the same
number hn of heads. For exchangeable Q, the right-hand side is constant for each path
ξn with the same number hn of heads. Then the inequality follows from the optimality of
the left-hand side for the hypergeometric prior with n = N .
Write
K∗n(ξn) =
1
ρhn(1− ρ)tn
hn!tn!
n!
.
Conceptually we need to consider K∗n for each n and the number of heads hn, separately.
Let Kα,βn denote the capital process for the beta-binomial model. Then K∗n(ξn)/Kα,βn (ξ) is
written as K∗n(ξn)
Kα,βn (ξn)
=
hn!tn!/n!
B(α + hn, β + tn)
B(α, β) ≥ 1.
Therefore
logK∗n(ξn)− logKα,βn (ξn) = log hn! + log tn!− log n!
− ( log Γ(α+ hn) + log Γ(β + tn)− log Γ(α + β + n))
+ logB(α, β).
Stirling’s formula for log x! is written as
0 < log x!−
[(
x+
1
2
)
log(x+ 1)− (x+ 1) + log
√
2π
]
<
1
12(x+ 1)
.
Hence we have
logK∗n(ξn)− logKα,βn (ξn) =
(
hn +
1
2
)
log hn −
(
hn + α− 1
2
)
log(hn + α)
+
(
tn +
1
2
)
log tn −
(
tn + β − 1
2
)
log(tn + β)
−
(
n +
1
2
)
log n+
(
n+ α + β − 1
2
)
log(n + α+ β)
+ logB(α, β) +O
(
1
min(h′n, t
′
n)
)
.
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The right-hand side is further simplified as
(1− α) log hn − α + (1− β) log tn − β − (1− α− β) logn+ (α + β)
+ logB(α, β) +O
(
1
min(h′n, t
′
n)
)
= logn + (1− α) log hn
n
+ (1− β) log tn
n
+ logB(α, β) +O
(
1
min(h′n, t
′
n)
)
.
We summarize the above calculation in the following proposition, which states that K∗n(ξn)
surpasses Kα,βn (ξn) only by a polynomial factor of n.
Proposition 4.2.
K∗n(ξn)
Kα,βn (ξn)
= nB(α, β)
(hn
n
)1−α(tn
n
)1−β
(1 +O(1/min(h′n, t
′
n)).
Considering the fact that Skeptic can achieve K∗n(ξn) only in “hindsight” (i.e. after
seeing the number of heads hn for each n) and the fact that K∗n(ξn) and Kα,βn (ξn) grow
exponentially when Reality violates SLLN, we see that the beta-binomial strategy is close
to optimum.
5 Capital process for the one-sided case
In this section we assume the protocol as before, but now Skeptic is required to choose
Mn ≥ 0. We consider Skeptic’s strategy P+ with
ν+i = max(νi, 0), (21)
where νi is given by (10). We can also consider the negative part strategy P− with
ν−i = min(νi, 0).
In the following, we investigate the relation between the behavior of the original capital
process KPn and the one-sided capital process KP+n . If Mn or νn changes the sign only
finite number of times, then the behavior of KP+n is fairly trivial. If νn is eventually all
non-negative, then KPn and KP+n are asymptotically equivalent. On the other hand if νn
is eventually negative, then KP+n stays constant, whereas the behavior of KPn is described
in Theorem 4.2. Therefore we will consider the case that νn changes the sign infinitely
often. At first, by writing
s˜n = (1− ρ)α− ρβ + sn,
we can express
νn =
s˜n−1
(α + β + n− 1)ρ(1− ρ) .
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Noting that at time n when s˜n changes the sign,
hn
n
= ρ+O
(1
n
)
,
we start at sufficiently large time n0 such that hn0/n0 ≃ ρ, and proceed to divide the
sequence {s˜n} into the following two types of blocks. For n0 ≤ k+1 ≤ l, consider a block
{k + 1, . . . , l}. We call it a non-negative block if
s˜k < 0, s˜k+1 ≥ 0, s˜k+2 ≥ 0, . . . , s˜l ≥ 0, s˜l+1 < 0.
Similarly we call it a negative block if
s˜k ≥ 0, s˜k+1 < 0, s˜k+2 < 0, . . . , s˜l < 0, s˜l+1 ≥ 0.
By definition, negative and non-negative blocks are alternating.
We first consider a particularly simple case of the fair-coin game ρ = 1/2 and sym-
metric prior α = β. In this case s˜n = sn = 0 when s˜n changes the sign, and the lengths of
the blocks are always even numbers. Then for each block {k + 1, . . . , l} we have hk = tk,
hl = tl and the capital ratio KPl /KPk is expressed as
KPl
KPk
= 22m
(α + hk)
2
m
(2α + 2hk)2m
=
m−1∏
j=0
2(α+ hk + j)
2(α + hk + j) + 1
< 1,
where l − k = 2m is an even number. As for the one-sided capital ratio, KP+l /KP+k =
KPl /KPk during a non-negative block, and KP
+
l /KP
+
k = 1 during a negative block. There-
fore KPn < KP+n holds for all n in the non-negative block.
Now we consider a general biased-coin game. When s˜n changes the sign, we have to
consider overshoot of order O(1/n). Therefore we need to carefully bound the capital
ratio KPl /KPk of P and the capital ratio KP+l /KP+k of P+ from above and below for each
negative or non-negative block. This is conducted based on the log capital formula given
by (18), that is
logKPn = n′D
(h′n
n′
∥∥∥ρ)− 1
2
log
h′nt
′
n
n′
+ c0(α, β) +O
(
1
min(h′n, t
′
n)
)
.
In the above, when n = k or l,
h′n
n′
= ρ+O
(1
n
)
,
t′n
n′
= 1− ρ+O
(1
n
)
,
and when δ is small, as was noted in Section 4,
D(ρ+ δ‖ρ) = δ
2
2ρ(1− ρ) +O(δ
3).
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Therefore with δ = x¯n = O(1/n) we have
n′D
(h′n
n′
∥∥∥ρ) = O(1
n
)
.
Hence we get for n = k or l
logKPn = −
1
2
log ρ(1− ρ)− 1
2
log n+ c0(α, β) +O
(1
n
)
,
so that it follows
log
KPl
KPk
= −1
2
log
l
k
+O
(1
k
)
,
which implies that there exists a constant C > 0 depending only on α, β, and ρ such that
−1
2
log
l
k
− C
k
< log
KPl
KPk
< −1
2
log
l
k
+
C
k
.
We apply this relation for successive non-negative and negative blocks by noting the
approximation formula
1
m
+
1
m+ 1
+ · · ·+ 1
n
≤
∫ n
m
dx
x
+
1
m
= log
n
m
+
1
m
.
Then we obtain at an end point nl of any block,(
−1
2
− C
)
log
nl
n0
− C
n0
< log
KPnl
KPn0
<
(
−1
2
+ C
)
log
nl
n0
+
C
n0
.
When we reach an end point nl after passing sufficiently many blocks, the one-sided
capital ratios KP+l /KP+k behave in the same way as KPl /KPk during non-negative blocks
and stay one during negative blocks, so that we can also bound logKP+nl /KP
+
n0
in the
following manner.
(
−1
2
− C
)
log
nl
n0
− C
n0
< log
KP+nl
KP+n0
< C log
nl
n0
+
C
n0
.
From the above two relations, it follows that at a sufficiently large end point nl, the
one-sided log capital logKP+nl differs from the original log capital logKPnl at most O(lognl).
This fact implies that the two log capitals logKP+n and logKPn behave similarly except for
O(logn). Thus from Theorem 4.2, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5.1. The one-sided Bayesian strategy P+ given by (21) weakly forces the one-
sided version of SLLN with the convergence rate O(
√
logn/n) and with the convergence
factor
√
ρ(1− ρ), that is
lim sup
n
√
nx¯n√
log n
>
√
ρ(1− ρ) ⇒ lim sup
n
KP+n =∞. (22)
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6 Some numerical examples
In this section we illustrate capital processes of our strategies for two data sets. The first
data set is based on the Nikkei 225 stock average index for 500 days starting January
2000. We set xn > 0 if the opening price of the n+ 1-st day was higher than the opening
price of the n-th day. The second data set is based on the first 500 digits in the fractional
part of π − 3 = 0.141592653589793.... We set xn > 0 if the n-th digit is in {5, . . . , 9}.
For the Nikkei data we have h500 = 221 heads and t500 = 279 tails for the 500 days. The
values of logK500 for the hypergeometric model (HG) and the beta-binomial strategies
for ρ = 1/2, 2/3, 2/5, α = β = 1, 100, 500, together with the positive-part (PP) and
negative-part (NP) strategies, are tabulated in Table 1. We see the exponential growth
of the capital process for ρ = 2/3. For this example it seems to to be advantageous to
take α = β = 100.
Table 1: Log capital process at n = 500 for Nikkei 225
α, β ρ = 1/2 ρ = 2/3 ρ = 2/5
HG 6.698416 56.24544 5.145427
1.0, 1.0 0.4818099 50.02884 -1.071180
(PP) -1.712525 0.0 -1.071180
(NP) 2.194335 50.02884 0.0
100, 100 1.781788 51.32881 0.2287981
(PP) -0.1556388 0.0 0.2287981
(NP) 1.937426 51.32881 0.0
500, 500 0.9195455 50.46657 -0.633444
(PP) -0.03559586 0.0 -0.633444
(NP) 0.9551413 50.46657 0.0
We plot the entire log capital processes of the beta-binomial strategy with its positive
part and negative part for the case of ρ = 1/2, α = β = 100 in Figure 1. The log capital
process of the beta-binomial strategy is plotted with a solid line, that of the positive-part
strategy is plotted with a dashed line, and that of the negative-part strategy is plotted
with a dotted line. We see that for this example the beta-binomial strategy is close to the
negative-part strategy. The log capital of the positive-part strategy stays constant after
about n = 90.
For the digits of π, we have h500 = 239 heads and t500 = 261 tails. The number of
heads and tails are more balanced for this data set than the Nikkei 225 case above. Table
2 gives the same information as in Table 1 for this data set. We see the same tendency
in Table 2 as in Table 1, although α = β = 500 performs better than α = β = 100.
As in Figure 1, the log capital processes of the beta-binomial strategy with its positive
part and negative part for the case of ρ = 1/2, α = β = 100 are plotted in Figure 2. The
log capital of the positive-part strategy stays constant after about n = 140.
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Figure 1: Nikkei 225 data (ρ = 1/2, α = β = 100)
Table 2: Log capital process at n = 500 for the digits of π
α, β ρ = 1/2 ρ = 2/3 ρ = 2/5
HG 3.816784 40.88716 9.562166
1.0, 1.0 -2.399822 34.67056 3.345560
(PP) -0.9942046 0.0 3.957064
(NP) -1.4056175 34.67056 -0.6115032
100, 100 -0.2810085 36.78937 5.464374
(PP) -0.1820164 0.0 5.464374
(NP) -0.09899215 36.78937 0.0
500, 500 -0.04136915 37.02901 5.704013
(PP) -0.04499401 0.0 5.704013
(NP) 0.003624851 37.02901 0.0
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown that for general biased-coin games, some simple Bayesian
models provide explicit strategies of Skeptic which weakly force the strong law of large
numbers with the convergence rate of O(
√
log n/n) and whose capital processes can be
analyzed in detail, leading naturally to the Kullback divergence.
We treated coin tossing and beta-binomial model for simplicity and for the sake of
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Figure 2: 500 digits of π (ρ = 1/2, α = β = 100)
explicit computations. However we expect that many of the results of this paper can be
generalized to multidimensional cases and more general prior distributions. Theorem 4.1
should hold for games with unique risk neutral probability.
We have only considered exchangeable priors Q. Strategies based on exchangeable
priors can not exploit some block patterns or Markov dependencies of Reality. For example
in the fair-coin game, the beta-binomial prior can not exploit the following pattern of
heads: 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . .. In order to exploit a variety of patterns in Reality’s moves, we
need to use a prior Q which contains hyperparameters corresponding to these patterns.
One might consider mixtures of priors, corresponding to various block patterns, Markov
dependence of various orders, etc. We can take priors covering various higher order
patterns and can analyze optimalities with respect to such priors. Another interesting
direction would be to extend our results to other limit theorems, such as the law of the
iterated logarithm. These subjects will be treated in our subsequent works.
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